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Case: Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal & Ors., (2020) 7 SCC 1; Civil Appeal Nos. 20825–20826 of 2017 and connected appeals.
Supreme Court of India | Three-Judge Bench | 14 July 2020

A CCTV recording is relied upon in a criminal trial. A party produces a WhatsApp screenshot. A bank supplies a computer-generated statement, or the police file a CD containing a recording. In each instance, counsel must ask a question before debating what the record proves: has the electronic evidence been produced in the manner required by law?

That question lies at the heart of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar. The judgment is sometimes summarised in one sentence—‘a Section 65B certificate is mandatory’. That summary is incomplete. The Supreme Court also distinguished original devices from copies, explained how a missing certificate might be obtained from a third party, and addressed the stage at which certification may be supplied.

How an election dispute became a leading electronic-evidence case

The dispute arose from the 2014 Maharashtra Assembly election for the Jalna constituency. The successful candidate’s nomination papers were challenged on the allegation that certain forms had been presented after the prescribed 3:00 p.m. deadline. Video recordings from cameras at the Returning Officer’s premises became material to the disputed chronology.

The Election Commission produced recordings on CDs/VCDs, but the certificate furnished with them did not satisfy the requirements of Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The litigation eventually required a three-Judge Bench to resolve conflicting approaches to the admissibility of electronic records. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals against the election judgment, while clarifying the applicable evidentiary rules.

1. When is a Section 65B certificate mandatory?

The Court reaffirmed Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473: when the party relies on a computer output—a copy, printout, extracted recording or other derivative electronic record—the special statutory conditions apply, including the certificate contemplated by Section 65B(4). The conditions are not replaced by ordinary rules for secondary documentary evidence.

The purpose is not a formal signature for its own sake. The certificate links the output to an identifiable computer or system, the manner of its production and the conditions in which the information was stored or processed. Without such a foundation, the court may be asked to treat an easily altered copy as if its origin and integrity were established.

The Court expressly rejected the proposition that oral testimony, standing in place of a required Section 65B certificate, is sufficient. It overruled the contrary relaxation associated with Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 2 SCC 801.

2. What if the original mobile phone, laptop or device is produced?

A crucial clarification appears in paragraph 72(b) of the judgment. The 65B(4) certificate was not necessary where the original electronic record itself was produced and proved—for example, by the owner or operator bringing the mobile phone or laptop containing the original information and testifying to its ownership or operation.

That is different from handing over a screenshot, exported chat, USB drive or CD said to contain information from the phone. Such an output may need the statutory certification because it is not the original information on the original device. Producing a device also does not remove objections about identity, relevance, alteration or the evidentiary weight of its contents.

Where the source is a large computer network, service-provider system or other infrastructure that cannot realistically be brought to court, the judgment emphasised the statutory route for proving the output through a certificate.

3. If the electronic record belongs to a third party, must the case fail?

No automatic answer follows merely from lack of possession. The Supreme Court rejected the idea that a party without control over the source computer receives a blanket exemption from certification. It explained that the party may seek the court’s assistance to summon the person or authority capable of issuing the certificate.

This distinction is important for call-detail records, CCTV systems controlled by a public authority, bank servers and similar records. A party should be able to show that the certificate was sought from the proper custodian, that the request was refused or unanswered, and that judicial assistance was pursued.

In the case before it, the Court recognised an exceptional situation where the parties had made all possible efforts, including through court orders, yet the relevant authorities failed to supply the proper certificate. It applied the principle that the law does not demand the impossible. That fact-specific conclusion must not be read as a general licence to file uncertified digital copies.

4. Can a certificate be filed later?

Section 65B did not itself prescribe a universal date by which certification had to be delivered. Arjun Panditrao explained that the certificate should ordinarily accompany the electronic output when it is produced, particularly where it is readily obtainable. If a defective certificate has been given or a third party has not supplied one, the trial court may require the responsible person to furnish it.

Timing nevertheless matters. In criminal proceedings, fair disclosure to the accused and the opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s material remain essential. The decision is not authority for introducing a surprise electronic record or post-dated certification in a way that prejudices the defence.

The Supreme Court also stressed preservation of electronic records and metadata. If the source data has disappeared by the time a certificate is issued, the defence may lose the ability to test the record against the original system.

5. Section 65B of the Evidence Act and the corresponding BSA provisions

The judgment in Arjun Panditrao interpreted the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, particularly Sections 65A and 65B. For proceedings governed by the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), which came into force on 1 July 2024, the current provisions must be separately examined. The old and new section numbers should not be treated as interchangeable without reading the updated text.

• Section 57 BSA — Primary evidence: corresponding broadly to Section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act. Explanations 4–7 expressly deal with electronic records created or stored in multiple files, records produced from proper custody (unless disputed), simultaneously stored or transmitted videos, and automated storage spaces.
• Section 61 BSA — Electronic or digital records: electronic form alone does not deny admissibility or legal effect; the statutory recognition is expressly subject to Section 63.
• Section 62 BSA — Special provision for proving electronic records: the contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with Section 63. This broadly corresponds to the role performed by Section 65A of the former Evidence Act.
• Section 63(1) BSA — Computer output: the conditions for treating a printout, stored, recorded or copied electronic output as a document admissible without production of the original. This broadly corresponds to Section 65B(1).
• Section 63(2)(a)–(d) BSA — Foundational conditions: regular use of the device, regular feeding of information, proper operation (or no impact from malfunction), and accurate derivation of the output. These broadly track Section 65B(2).
• Section 63(3) BSA — Multiple devices and systems: addresses computers or communication devices operating on a standalone system, network, information-processing resource or through an intermediary; compare Section 65B(3).
• Section 63(4)(a)–(c) BSA — Certificate: identification of the electronic record, particulars of the device and manner of production, satisfaction of the statutory conditions, and certification by the responsible person and an expert; compare Section 65B(4).
• Section 63(5) BSA — Interpretive provisions: addresses how information is supplied to a device and how electronic outputs may be produced.
• Section 170(2) BSA — Repeal and saving: identifies proceedings that continue under the repealed Indian Evidence Act.

6. How the new Section 63(4) certificate works

Section 63(4) BSA provides for submitting the certificate along with the electronic record at each instance where that record is submitted for admission. The certification covers the record, the device and the production process. The statutory wording refers to signature by the person in charge of the computer, communication device or management of the relevant activities, and an expert.

The Schedule to the BSA, read with Section 63(4)(c), prescribes two certificate components: Part A (Party) and Part B (Expert). It seeks particulars such as device or source type (mobile phone, DVR, computer, server, cloud storage), make and model, available identifiers, hash value and hashing algorithm, with a hash report annexed. A lawyer should use the prescribed form applicable to the proceeding rather than simply relabelling an old Section 65B certificate.

Section 57 and original electronic records: Arjun Panditrao held that the old Section 65B(4) certificate was unnecessary where an original electronic record was produced and proved as primary evidence. The BSA now contains expanded primary-evidence explanations in Section 57. However, Section 61 expressly refers back to Section 63, so whether a particular item is genuinely primary evidence and how it must be tendered require analysis under the new statute. A copied screenshot or extracted pen-drive file should not be casually described as an original merely to avoid certification.

7. Which law governs a case already pending on 1 July 2024?

The commencement date alone does not resolve the question. Under Section 170(2) BSA, an application, trial, inquiry, investigation, proceeding or appeal that was already pending immediately before 1 July 2024 continues under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as saved by that provision. Identify the relevant proceeding and its commencement date before filing or objecting to electronic evidence.

For example, a lawyer dealing with a newly instituted proceeding governed by the BSA should examine Sections 57, 61, 62 and 63 and the prescribed Schedule; a saved older proceeding may instead require the Section 65B(4) certificate under the former Act. The question should be answered from Section 170(2) and the actual procedural record, not a generic date printed on a certificate.

8. Practical preparation of CCTV, WhatsApp, CDR and other electronic evidence

• Identify the source: Is the evidence on the original phone or DVR, or is it an exported file, printout, copied CD or downloaded record?
• Preserve the original: Retain the device, original file, extraction details and relevant metadata. Do not rely only on a forwarded or edited version.
• Trace the person who can certify: For a server or third-party system, identify the custodian or responsible official and record requests made for certification.
• Match the applicable statute: Determine whether the matter is governed by the saved Evidence Act regime or the BSA, and prepare the required certificate accordingly.
• Deal with timing early: Seek missing certification or a court direction promptly, before preservation periods expire or the opposing party loses a fair chance to inspect the material.
• Separate admissibility from proof: A formally compliant certificate does not establish that the contents of a message are true, that a voice belongs to a named person, or that a recording has not otherwise been manipulated.

The point that is often missed

The central lesson of Arjun Panditrao is not that electronic records should be excluded on technicalities, nor that judges may overlook the statute whenever certification is inconvenient. The judgment requires counsel and courts to address both concerns: statutory assurance about the electronic output and a workable procedure to obtain certification from whoever controls the source.

For criminal defence, civil litigation, matrimonial disputes and commercial proceedings, a sound objection should identify whether the material is an original or an output, what certificate is required, whether it exists, and whether the alleged defect can properly be cured. Those questions are more useful than a blanket assertion that every screenshot is inadmissible.

Judgment and statutory references

• Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 — particularly paragraphs 45–50, 59 and 72.
• Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 — Sections 61–63, Section 170 and the Schedule.
• Prescribed Section 63 certificate schedule (NCRB).
• Related reading: overview of Section 65B and BSA Section 63.

Editorial note (14 November 2026): This commentary concerns the statutory method of proving electronic records. Admissibility, objections, appropriate relief and transitional application depend on the particular proceeding and its evidence.

Related practice information: criminal proceedings and bail in Delhi.

Case: Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1
Supreme Court of India | 10 April 2006

A person may work for a government department for years, sometimes performing duties similar to those of permanent staff. Does the length of that service create a legal right to a permanent appointment?

The Constitution Bench ruling in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) remains one of the starting points for answering that question.

The constitutional issue

The litigation concerned temporary, daily-wage and other non-regular appointments in public employment. The Court was required to consider those employees’ claims against the constitutional requirement that public posts ordinarily be filled through a fair recruitment process.

Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution require equality of opportunity in public employment. The Court reasoned that allowing appointments made outside the prescribed process to become permanent merely through the passage of time could prejudice qualified persons who never had an opportunity to compete.

The general rule

The Supreme Court held that temporary, casual or contractual service does not, by itself, confer an enforceable right to absorption or regularisation.

The length of service and the hardship caused by uncertainty may be relevant considerations, but they cannot automatically cure a recruitment process contrary to constitutional requirements.

An important, limited qualification

The judgment also recognised the possibility of a one-time exercise for certain irregular—not illegal—appointments. It referred to duly qualified persons who had worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts, without the protection of court or tribunal orders.

That qualification is often misunderstood as a general rule that every employee completing ten years must be made permanent. It is not. Whether the post was sanctioned, whether the employee possessed the prescribed qualifications and whether the appointment was irregular rather than illegal are central questions.

The Supreme Court later explained aspects of this exception in State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247.

Why it matters in service litigation

A regularisation claim needs more than an appointment letter and a calculation of years worked. Recruitment rules, sanctioned strength, qualifications, the circumstances of engagement and applicable policies or later judgments must all be examined.

For public employers, the same case underscores the importance of making regular appointments through lawful recruitment rather than relying indefinitely on informal arrangements.

Umadevi does not reduce public employment to a question of sympathy or seniority alone. It places the individual’s claim within the constitutional obligation to keep recruitment fair and open.

Judgment: Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1.

Related practice information: service and employment law in Delhi.

Case: Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni, (2020) 10 SCC 783
Supreme Court of India | 2 November 2020

A delayed housing project can leave buyers paying instalments and loan interest while possession remains uncertain. One question repeatedly raised in such disputes is whether the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) requires a homebuyer to pursue only the remedies available under that legislation.

The Supreme Court addressed that issue in Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni. Its answer was significant for buyers who had already invoked consumer law.

The dispute

The case concerned purchasers of apartments in a residential project in Gurugram. Completion had been delayed, and the buyers approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission seeking relief.

The Commission allowed their complaints. The developer challenged those decisions, contending, among other things, that the introduction of RERA altered the jurisdiction of consumer forums in relation to registered real estate projects.

Does RERA close the consumer forum’s door?

The Supreme Court rejected that contention. It examined the provisions of RERA, including Sections 18, 79 and 88, and held that the statutory remedies were not intended to extinguish the additional remedy available under consumer protection law.

The restriction on civil-court jurisdiction under Section 79 did not bar consumer forums from entertaining eligible complaints. The Court also noted that RERA itself preserved the availability of other remedies.

The developer’s appeals were dismissed.

What this means for a homebuyer

A buyer facing delayed possession may need to compare the remedies, procedure and jurisdiction of RERA with those under consumer protection legislation. Eligibility as a ‘consumer’, the relief actually sought and the relevant statutory requirements still have to be examined.

The judgment should not be read as permission to obtain duplicate compensation for the same injury. It confirms the availability of alternative statutory avenues; it does not dispense with ordinary requirements of maintainability or proof.

Why the ruling remains relevant

Although the dispute arose under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the principle that a special real-estate remedy does not by itself displace consumer protection remains important in the later consumer-law framework.

For both purchasers and developers, Imperia Structures makes one point clear: the creation of RERA did not make every consumer complaint concerning a housing project legally unavailable.

Judgment: Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni, (2020) 10 SCC 783.

Related practice information: consumer and real estate remedies in Delhi.

Case: Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17
Supreme Court of India | 25 January 2019

When a company defaults on a substantial payment, its creditors naturally want recovery. Yet the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was designed to do something more complex than collect unpaid invoices.

That distinction was central to the Supreme Court’s decision in Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, which considered constitutional challenges to important provisions of the Code.

What was challenged?

Among other issues, the petitioners questioned the different treatment of financial and operational creditors and the procedures through which they could initiate insolvency proceedings.

The contention was that these distinctions were arbitrary. The Supreme Court rejected that broad challenge and upheld the constitutional framework of the Code.

Resolution comes before liquidation

The Court emphasised the legislation’s focus on reviving the corporate debtor where possible, preserving its existence as a going concern and maximising the value of its assets.

This helps explain why an insolvency proceeding is not equivalent to an ordinary money recovery suit. Once the corporate insolvency resolution process begins, the law introduces a collective framework for examining the company’s future and the treatment of its creditors.

Payment of a particular creditor’s dues is important, but it is not the only objective against which the process must be understood.

Why do financial and operational creditors have different roles?

The Court considered the distinct positions of lenders and those supplying goods or services. Financial creditors are generally positioned to assess viability, restructuring and the feasibility of proposed resolution plans. The Code accordingly gives them a central role through the committee of creditors.

Operational creditors retain statutory protections, but the two classes do not perform identical functions within the insolvency framework. The Court found a rational basis for treating them differently.

What the decision means for businesses

Before filing an insolvency application, a creditor needs to consider the nature of the debt, the existence of default, the statutory requirements for admission and the consequences of initiating a collective process. An operational debt may also raise questions about any pre-existing dispute.

For corporate debtors, the case shows why a serious payment default cannot be treated as merely another bilateral contractual disagreement.

The essential point of Swiss Ribbons is easy to miss: creditor recoveries matter, but the Code’s principal purpose is a structured insolvency resolution process, with liquidation as a consequence where resolution cannot be achieved.

Judgment: Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17.

Related practice information: commercial and insolvency matters in Delhi.

Case: Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324
Supreme Court of India | 4 November 2020

A maintenance proceeding often begins with two sharply different accounts of the same household finances. One party says there is no regular income; the other points to expenses, assets or a standard of living that appears inconsistent with that claim.

In Rajnesh v. Neha, the Supreme Court recognised how difficult it is to determine fair maintenance when essential financial information is missing or when parties have approached different courts under different statutes.

Why were guidelines necessary?

Claims for maintenance may arise under matrimonial legislation, the law governing domestic violence and provisions concerning maintenance of dependants. Proceedings can overlap, sometimes resulting in different orders without the second court having a complete picture of the first.

The Supreme Court therefore issued guidelines intended to create greater consistency in the consideration of maintenance claims.

Disclosure is not optional

A central direction was that parties in maintenance proceedings should file the prescribed affidavits disclosing assets and liabilities. These documents are intended to place relevant income, financial obligations, assets and expenditure before the court.

That does not mean a figure stated in an affidavit must be accepted without scrutiny. Documentary records, explanations of transactions and the credibility of the disclosures remain important.

What if maintenance has already been awarded elsewhere?

The Court held that earlier maintenance proceedings and orders must be disclosed in subsequent proceedings. A court assessing a later claim should account for maintenance already awarded and consider an appropriate adjustment or set-off.

The principle is not that a person is barred from seeking relief under another law. Rather, the same maintenance entitlement should not be counted twice without regard to an existing order. Any change to the earlier order must be sought before the court that passed it.

The starting date of maintenance

The judgment also directed that maintenance be awarded from the date of filing the application, rather than allowing delays in disposal to defeat the purpose of support.

For litigants, this makes the date of the application and the calculation of arrears important parts of the dispute, not mere procedural details.

A practical reading

Rajnesh v. Neha does not prescribe a fixed percentage of income that must be paid in every case. Quantum depends on the circumstances, including the parties’ means, reasonable needs, obligations and the material before the court.

Its enduring contribution is procedural fairness: disclosure by both sides, recognition of existing orders and a more consistent approach to maintenance from the date of application.

Judgment: Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324.

Related practice information: family and matrimonial proceedings in Delhi.

Case: Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1
Supreme Court of India | 14 December 2020

An arbitration clause can resolve many commercial disagreements without a conventional civil trial. It cannot, however, confer jurisdiction over every imaginable dispute. That was one of the important distinctions examined in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation.

The judgment addressed two connected questions: which disputes can lawfully be decided by an arbitral tribunal, and how closely should a court examine that issue when asked to refer the parties to arbitration?

The dispute behind the decision

The proceedings arose in the context of a landlord-tenant dispute and an arbitration agreement. Earlier decisions had created uncertainty over whether tenancy matters were capable of being resolved by arbitration. The Supreme Court used the reference to clarify the broader law of arbitrability.

The Court drew a distinction between ordinary landlord-tenant disputes governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which may be arbitrable, and disputes governed by special rent-control legislation conferring exclusive jurisdiction on particular courts or forums.

The test for non-arbitrability

The Supreme Court explained that arbitration is generally inappropriate where the dispute concerns rights against the world at large rather than merely the parties; directly affects third-party rights and requires centralised determination; involves sovereign or public-interest functions; or is reserved by statute, expressly or by necessary implication, for another forum.

This is not a formula to be applied mechanically. The nature of the right, the relief claimed and the governing statute all matter. Simply calling a dispute ‘commercial’ does not make it arbitrable.

Who decides whether the dispute can go to arbitration?

The Court also cautioned against turning an application under Section 8 or Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 into a full hearing on the merits.

At the referral stage, judicial scrutiny is limited. A court may refuse reference where invalidity or non-arbitrability is manifest. Where the objection requires disputed factual examination or raises a genuinely arguable question, it will ordinarily be left to the arbitral tribunal.

What contracting parties should take from the ruling

Before invoking arbitration, parties should examine not only the wording of their arbitration clause but also the statutory character of the dispute. That is particularly important in agreements involving regulated rights or remedies assigned to specialist authorities.

The judgment protects the parties’ decision to arbitrate while recognising that contractual consent cannot displace every statutory jurisdiction. Both propositions are necessary to understand Vidya Drolia.

Judgment: Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1.

Related practice information: commercial litigation and arbitration in Delhi.

Case: Kailash Nath Associates v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 4 SCC 136
Supreme Court of India | 9 January 2015

A forfeiture clause may appear straightforward when an agreement is signed. If one party fails to fulfil its obligations, the other retains the deposit or demands an agreed sum. But does the existence of such a clause, by itself, justify forfeiture?

The Supreme Court examined this question in Kailash Nath Associates v. Delhi Development Authority, a decision that remains relevant to contractual disputes, property transactions and claims for liquidated damages.

How the dispute arose

Kailash Nath Associates emerged as the successful bidder in an auction conducted by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA). It deposited ₹78 lakh as earnest money towards the purchase of a plot.

The transaction did not proceed as originally contemplated. Extensions were granted for payment of the balance consideration, but the DDA eventually cancelled the allotment and forfeited the deposited amount. The property was subsequently auctioned at a substantially higher price. This became an important circumstance when the dispute reached the Supreme Court.

What the Supreme Court held

The Court examined Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which governs compensation where a contract specifies an amount payable upon breach.

It concluded that the forfeiture could not be sustained on the facts of the case. There had been no established contractual breach by Kailash Nath Associates, and the DDA had not suffered a loss justifying the forfeiture.

The judgment also clarified a broader principle: a contractual amount stipulated as damages does not automatically become recoverable merely because the agreement mentions it.

Where actual loss is capable of proof, such proof remains relevant. Where loss is difficult or impossible to quantify, a genuine pre-estimate of damages may justify reasonable compensation. Even then, the contractual amount ordinarily operates as a ceiling, not an automatic entitlement.

Why the judgment matters in commercial disputes

Consider an agreement under which a purchaser pays a substantial advance and the seller later seeks to retain it, alleging breach.

The inquiry cannot end with the forfeiture clause. The circumstances of the alleged default, the obligations of the parties, their correspondence, and the loss said to have resulted from the breach may all become material.

The same reasoning is relevant to supply contracts, development agreements and commercial arrangements containing liquidated damages provisions.

The larger lesson

Kailash Nath Associates does not render every forfeiture or liquidated damages clause unenforceable. It requires courts to examine the contractual terms alongside the actual circumstances of the dispute.

The distinction is significant. A clause may provide for compensation, but Section 74 does not ordinarily permit a windfall disconnected from a legally sustainable claim. For anyone drafting or litigating a commercial contract, the judgment is a reminder that precise contractual language and evidence of breach remain equally important.

Judgment: Kailash Nath Associates v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 4 SCC 136.

Related practice information: commercial litigation and arbitration in Delhi.

Case note | Delhi High Court | Proceedings as recorded in July–August 2024

A public interest petition before the Delhi High Court sought directions concerning representation of women advocates in the Bar Council of Delhi, Delhi High Court Bar Association and district bar associations in Delhi. The proceedings also prompted discussion about conduct during bar-association elections.

The petition and the Court’s orders

In Shobha Gupta and Another v. Bar Council of Delhi and Others, W.P.(C) 9514/2024, the order dated 18 July 2024 recorded a request for reservation of one-third of seats for women advocates in the relevant professional bodies. The petition referred to representation of women in bar bodies and the related institutional concerns.

At the hearing on 12 August 2024, the Delhi High Court recorded that the President of the Delhi High Court Bar Association and the Chairman of the Coordination Committee would consult stakeholders and return with instructions within two weeks. The matter was listed for 4 September 2024.

Why the issue matters

The proceedings raised questions about representation in professional bodies and the standards expected in bar elections. Reporting from that period also discussed the use of hoardings and election publicity. These issues should be distinguished from the specific directions contained in the Court’s orders.

Case references

Delhi High Court order dated 18 July 2024 and order dated 12 August 2024, in W.P.(C) 9514/2024.

Editorial note: This article records developments as at August 2024. It does not purport to state the final outcome of the petition or subsequent election rules. It is general legal information, not legal advice.

Supreme Court of India | Usha Devi & Ors. v. Ram Kumar Singh & Ors. | Civil Appeal No. 8446 of 2024 | 5 August 2024 | 2024 INSC 599

The Supreme Court explained the distinction between the date fixed for performance of an agreement to sell and a separate clause describing the period for which that agreement remains valid. The distinction determined limitation in a suit for specific performance.

Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963

Article 54 prescribes a three-year limitation period for a suit for specific performance. Where a date for performance is fixed, time runs from that date. Where no date for performance is fixed, the relevant starting point is when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. Identifying which limb applies requires examination of the agreement and the surrounding facts.

Facts and decision

In the case before the Court, the agreement was dated 17 December 1989 and contemplated execution of the sale deed within one month. The period for performance therefore expired on 16 January 1990. The Court held that the three-year limitation period expired in January 1993; the suit filed in September 1993 was time-barred.

The agreement separately stated that it would remain valid for five years. The Court held that this clause did not extend the date fixed for performance. The appeal was allowed and the decree for specific performance was set aside. The Court also directed return of the advance amount with interest in the circumstances of the case.

Practical distinction

An agreement’s general validity period cannot automatically be substituted for an express date fixed for performance when applying Article 54. Each instrument must be read as a whole; the rule is not that every suit runs from the date of the agreement.

Primary source: Supreme Court judgment, 5 August 2024 (PDF).

Editorial note: This is a summary of the identified decision, not advice on limitation in a particular transaction.

Delhi High Court | RITES Ltd. v. Ahuwalia Contract (India) Ltd. & Anr. | O.M.P. (COMM) 56/2019 | 7 March 2024 | 2024:DHC:1921

The Delhi High Court considered whether an arbitral tribunal could grant interest on delayed contractual payments despite an express contractual bar. The dispute concerned a construction contract and an arbitral award dated 20 September 2018.

The contractual provisions and the challenge

RITES challenged the award to the extent it granted interest under Claim No. 3 on outstanding bill payments. It relied on provisions governing payment of the final bill and dispute resolution, contending that the contract excluded such interest.

Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Section 31(7)(a) begins with the words “unless otherwise agreed by the parties.” The Court examined the contractual terms in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Garg Builders v. BHEL and Union of India v. Manraj Enterprises. The Court held that, on the contract before it, the award of interest challenged under Claim No. 3 was contrary to the parties’ express agreement.

Outcome and limits of the decision

The High Court set aside the award under Claim No. 3. It expressly clarified that post-award interest was not challenged and was not set aside. The ruling must therefore not be read as eliminating all categories of arbitral interest in every case.

The effect of an exclusion clause depends upon its wording, the period of interest concerned and the governing statutory provisions.

Judgment: RITES Ltd. v. Ahuwalia Contract (India) Ltd., Delhi High Court, 7 March 2024.

Editorial note: This case note concerns the decision cited above. It does not constitute advice on a particular arbitration clause.