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Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage: Can Divorce Be Granted Without Both Spouses Agreeing?

Judgment: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, 2023 INSC 468; (2023) 14 SCC 231 | Supreme Court Constitution Bench | 1 May 2023.

A divorce petition may remain contested long after the parties have ceased living together. Sometimes one spouse insists that the marriage can still be saved while the other says that the relationship has become entirely unworkable. Does prolonged separation alone bring an end to the legal marriage?

In Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court examined the scope of Article 142 of the Constitution, under which the Court may pass orders necessary to do complete justice in a cause or matter pending before it.

The question of irretrievable breakdown

Irretrievable breakdown is not a general, standalone statutory ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 merely because a party alleges it. The Supreme Court, however, recognised that its own extraordinary constitutional power may, in a suitable case, be used to dissolve a marriage that has completely broken down.

The Bench held that this power can be exercised even when one spouse opposes the dissolution. That does not mean that opposition is irrelevant, nor does it create an automatic entitlement to divorce whenever parties have been separated for a certain number of years.

What does the Court look at?

The Court identified relevant considerations including how long the parties cohabited, when they last lived together, the nature of allegations made, the cumulative effect of their litigation, efforts at reconciliation, and the length of separation.

It also emphasised the economic and social position of the spouses, the existence of children and the implications for their welfare. A decree that ends a marriage is not the same as an order resolving all financial and parental obligations arising from it.

The difference between the Supreme Court and a Family Court

The distinction is essential. Article 142 confers an extraordinary power on the Supreme Court. A Family Court does not receive that constitutional jurisdiction simply because Shilpa Sailesh has been decided.

Ordinary matrimonial proceedings continue to be governed by the statutory grounds, procedures and evidentiary requirements of the applicable legislation. Parties should therefore be cautious about pleading irretrievable breakdown as though it were automatically available as an independent ground in every forum.

Can the six-month waiting period be dispensed with?

The judgment also addressed the Court’s power, in an appropriate case, to grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent without insisting on the second-motion procedure prescribed by Section 13-B. That is a separate issue from dissolving a marriage despite one party’s opposition.

The waiver of a procedural period and the determination that a marriage is beyond repair answer different legal questions. They should not be treated as interchangeable remedies.

The practical lesson

For a litigant, the history of the marriage should be documented carefully: periods of cohabitation and separation, previous proceedings, settlement discussions, financial arrangements and the position of children. Broad accusations about a ‘dead marriage’ are not a substitute for a precise factual record.

The decision is important because it recognises that legal formalities should not compel an entirely unworkable marriage to continue in exceptional cases before the Supreme Court. Equally, it preserves the need to examine fairness to the spouse who opposes divorce.

Judgment reference: Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, 2023 INSC 468.

Related reading on this site

The applicable statutory grounds and reliefs must be considered separately in any pending matrimonial case.

Can One Party Choose the Arbitrator? The Supreme Court’s 2024 Constitution Bench Ruling

Judgment: Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV), 2024 INSC 857 | Supreme Court Constitution Bench | 8 November 2024.

A commercial contract may provide that disputes will be decided by a sole arbitrator appointed by one contracting party, or by a tribunal chosen from a panel prepared by that party. The drafting may be common. Its fairness is another matter.

In November 2024, a five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court revisited the law governing unilateral appointments. The decision is especially significant for contractors dealing with public sector undertakings and government bodies.

The question before the Constitution Bench

Earlier rulings had emphasised the neutrality required in appointments. In TRF Ltd. v. Energo Engineering Projects Ltd. and Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd., the Court considered the position of an interested or ineligible person controlling the appointment of an arbitrator.

A different approach taken in earlier litigation involving the Central Organisation for Railway Electrification had generated uncertainty, particularly where one party maintained a panel and the other was required to choose from it.

What the majority decided

By a majority of three to two, the Constitution Bench held that a clause empowering one party to appoint a sole arbitrator unilaterally is impermissible. The majority also considered the unfairness of making one party choose an arbitrator from a panel curated exclusively by the other party.

The Court linked this conclusion to the requirements of independence, impartiality and equal treatment of parties. Equality is not an issue that begins only after an arbitral tribunal is constituted; the process by which the tribunal is selected matters too.

The Court did not say that a public sector undertaking is forbidden from maintaining a list of possible arbitrators. The problem arises when the procedure improperly gives one side controlling influence over who will decide the dispute.

Prospective application is crucial: the majority expressly directed that the law laid down in the reference would apply prospectively to appointments of arbitrators made after 8 November 2024, specifying that this direction applies to three-member tribunals. The Court did not declare every arbitration appointment made before the decision automatically void. Historic appointments must be tested against the law and procedural posture applicable to them.

Why this matters when drafting contracts

An arbitration clause should identify a constitution procedure that does not allow either party to dominate selection of the decision-maker. If the parties genuinely agree on a neutral process, or a neutral appointing institution is involved, the risk of a later appointment challenge is reduced.

For existing contracts, a party should read the precise clause and examine when and how the appointment was made. The legal effect of the judgment in an individual proceeding can depend on its procedural posture and applicable law.

A practical point for litigation

Objections to appointment are often raised under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, including provisions dealing with disclosure, ineligibility and appointment by the court. They should not be left to vague allegations of bias. The relevant contractual terms, appointment letters and any objections or waivers should be examined together.

The central lesson is that party autonomy in arbitration is important but cannot be separated from the requirement of a fair tribunal.

Official source: Supreme Court of India, 2024 landmark judgment summary (2024 INSC 857).

Related reading on this site

This is a commentary on the principles discussed by the Constitution Bench, not a substitute for reviewing the complete judgment and later case law.

Cheque Bounce Cases: Can an Accused Rebut the Presumption Without Proving Innocence Beyond Doubt?

Judgment: Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 | Supreme Court | 7 May 2010.

In a cheque dishonour case, the signature on the cheque is frequently undisputed. The real contest concerns why the cheque was issued: was it payment of an existing liability, a security instrument, or part of a transaction that never produced an enforceable debt?

The Supreme Court’s judgment in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan explains why the law initially favours the cheque holder and, equally importantly, how an accused person may contest that presumption.

The statutory starting point

Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 creates an offence when its statutory requirements are met. Section 139 requires the court to presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder received the cheque towards discharge, wholly or partly, of a debt or other liability.

In Rangappa, the Court clarified that this presumption includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. That finding is important because the complainant need not prove the underlying debt as though no presumption existed in every case.

Does a signed cheque mean automatic conviction?

No. A statutory presumption is not an irrebuttable conclusion. The accused may raise a probable defence that makes the claimed debt or liability doubtful. The standard for rebuttal is the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

This means the defence can succeed by showing that its account is sufficiently probable on the evidence. The accused may rely on inconsistencies in the complainant’s documents or evidence, surrounding circumstances and cross-examination. The law does not invariably require the accused to enter the witness box personally.

Why the underlying transaction still matters

A dispute about a loan may turn on contemporaneous messages, bank transfers, account books, acknowledgments, repayment records or the circumstances in which the cheque changed hands. A dispute about goods or services may turn on purchase orders, deliveries, invoices, debit notes and reconciliation of accounts.

Merely describing a cheque as ‘security’ is not necessarily a complete defence. The relevant question remains whether, at the legally material time, an enforceable liability existed and whether the statutory elements of the offence are satisfied.

Procedure must also be established

The complainant must still satisfy the separate procedural requirements of Section 138, including timely presentation, the required demand notice, the statutory opportunity to make payment and the prescribed period for filing the complaint, subject to the law governing delay.

For this reason, even an apparently straightforward cheque case needs a chronology of presentation, dishonour, receipt of notice and subsequent steps.

What Rangappa changed in practical terms

The decision brings discipline to both sides of a dishonour proceeding. A complainant starts with a statutory evidentiary advantage, but cannot ignore a credible defence. An accused cannot simply deny the debt and expect the presumption to disappear, but is not required to establish an impossible negative to the criminal standard.

The best analysis begins with the transaction itself, not merely with the dishonour memo.

Read the judgment: Rangappa v. Sri Mohan.

Related reading on this site

Every cheque dishonour case depends on its records, the statutory time limits and the evidence actually produced.

Can a GPA Transfer Ownership of Property in Delhi? The Suraj Lamp Judgment

Judgment: Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656 | Supreme Court | 11 October 2011.

In Delhi property transactions, the expression ‘GPA sale’ has been used for decades. A prospective buyer may receive an agreement to sell, a general power of attorney, a Will and payment receipts, often with possession. The paperwork can look extensive. The difficult question is whether it actually transfers ownership.

The Supreme Court addressed that distinction in Suraj Lamp & Industries v. State of Haryana. The decision is regularly relevant when parties seek declaration of title, injunction, possession or specific performance in disputes involving informal transfers.

What was the Court examining?

The Court was concerned with transactions that sought to avoid a registered deed of conveyance by using combinations of an agreement to sell, a power of attorney and a Will. Such arrangements had also generated problems involving stamp duty, registration and uncertainty over ownership.

A power of attorney authorises an agent to act for the principal. An agreement to sell records a contractual promise. A Will operates in a different legal sphere and is generally revocable during the testator’s lifetime. None performs the function of a duly executed and registered sale deed simply because the documents are executed together.

The rule on transfer of title

The Supreme Court held that transactions described as SA/GPA/Will transfers do not, by themselves, convey title in immovable property. A transfer by sale ordinarily requires a registered conveyance in compliance with the applicable law. Possession and payment, although potentially relevant to other reliefs, do not automatically cure the absence of a legally effective transfer of ownership.

This distinction matters particularly in civil litigation. A person relying only on a GPA package may find that the documents support a contractual claim but not the declaratory title claim as framed.

What the judgment did not prohibit

The judgment did not invalidate genuine powers of attorney used for lawful agency purposes. An owner may authorise another person to execute a conveyance on the owner’s behalf, subject to the relevant formalities. Nor did the Court say that every agreement to sell becomes meaningless. Such an agreement may provide the basis for a suit for specific performance, subject to limitation, proof and other statutory requirements.

The Court also recognised that documents can have evidentiary or other legal significance in their proper setting. What they cannot do is replace a registered conveyance merely by being grouped into a ‘sale package’.

Questions worth asking before litigation

In a Delhi property dispute, the first exercise should be to trace the chain of title, examine registered instruments and identify precisely what each unregistered or registered document was intended to accomplish. The next question is the appropriate relief: ownership declaration, specific performance, possession, injunction or another remedy.

A limitation analysis is equally important. A litigant should not assume that an old GPA transaction can be converted into title through a broadly worded plaint.

The practical significance

Suraj Lamp is not a blanket judgment against agency or contractual arrangements. It is a warning against treating a collection of documents as equivalent to a registered transfer of immovable property. In property litigation, the legal effect of the document is more important than the label given to the transaction.

Read the judgment: Supreme Court decision in Suraj Lamp & Industries.

Related reading on this site

This article discusses the principle generally. The effect of a particular document depends on its terms, execution, registration and the applicable law.

Section 65B Certificate Missing? Arjun Panditrao and BSA Section 63 Explained

Case: Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal & Ors., (2020) 7 SCC 1; Civil Appeal Nos. 20825–20826 of 2017 and connected appeals.
Supreme Court of India | Three-Judge Bench | 14 July 2020

A CCTV recording is relied upon in a criminal trial. A party produces a WhatsApp screenshot. A bank supplies a computer-generated statement, or the police file a CD containing a recording. In each instance, counsel must ask a question before debating what the record proves: has the electronic evidence been produced in the manner required by law?

That question lies at the heart of Arjun Panditrao Khotkar. The judgment is sometimes summarised in one sentence—‘a Section 65B certificate is mandatory’. That summary is incomplete. The Supreme Court also distinguished original devices from copies, explained how a missing certificate might be obtained from a third party, and addressed the stage at which certification may be supplied.

How an election dispute became a leading electronic-evidence case

The dispute arose from the 2014 Maharashtra Assembly election for the Jalna constituency. The successful candidate’s nomination papers were challenged on the allegation that certain forms had been presented after the prescribed 3:00 p.m. deadline. Video recordings from cameras at the Returning Officer’s premises became material to the disputed chronology.

The Election Commission produced recordings on CDs/VCDs, but the certificate furnished with them did not satisfy the requirements of Section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The litigation eventually required a three-Judge Bench to resolve conflicting approaches to the admissibility of electronic records. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals against the election judgment, while clarifying the applicable evidentiary rules.

1. When is a Section 65B certificate mandatory?

The Court reaffirmed Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473: when the party relies on a computer output—a copy, printout, extracted recording or other derivative electronic record—the special statutory conditions apply, including the certificate contemplated by Section 65B(4). The conditions are not replaced by ordinary rules for secondary documentary evidence.

The purpose is not a formal signature for its own sake. The certificate links the output to an identifiable computer or system, the manner of its production and the conditions in which the information was stored or processed. Without such a foundation, the court may be asked to treat an easily altered copy as if its origin and integrity were established.

The Court expressly rejected the proposition that oral testimony, standing in place of a required Section 65B certificate, is sufficient. It overruled the contrary relaxation associated with Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 2 SCC 801.

2. What if the original mobile phone, laptop or device is produced?

A crucial clarification appears in paragraph 72(b) of the judgment. The 65B(4) certificate was not necessary where the original electronic record itself was produced and proved—for example, by the owner or operator bringing the mobile phone or laptop containing the original information and testifying to its ownership or operation.

That is different from handing over a screenshot, exported chat, USB drive or CD said to contain information from the phone. Such an output may need the statutory certification because it is not the original information on the original device. Producing a device also does not remove objections about identity, relevance, alteration or the evidentiary weight of its contents.

Where the source is a large computer network, service-provider system or other infrastructure that cannot realistically be brought to court, the judgment emphasised the statutory route for proving the output through a certificate.

3. If the electronic record belongs to a third party, must the case fail?

No automatic answer follows merely from lack of possession. The Supreme Court rejected the idea that a party without control over the source computer receives a blanket exemption from certification. It explained that the party may seek the court’s assistance to summon the person or authority capable of issuing the certificate.

This distinction is important for call-detail records, CCTV systems controlled by a public authority, bank servers and similar records. A party should be able to show that the certificate was sought from the proper custodian, that the request was refused or unanswered, and that judicial assistance was pursued.

In the case before it, the Court recognised an exceptional situation where the parties had made all possible efforts, including through court orders, yet the relevant authorities failed to supply the proper certificate. It applied the principle that the law does not demand the impossible. That fact-specific conclusion must not be read as a general licence to file uncertified digital copies.

4. Can a certificate be filed later?

Section 65B did not itself prescribe a universal date by which certification had to be delivered. Arjun Panditrao explained that the certificate should ordinarily accompany the electronic output when it is produced, particularly where it is readily obtainable. If a defective certificate has been given or a third party has not supplied one, the trial court may require the responsible person to furnish it.

Timing nevertheless matters. In criminal proceedings, fair disclosure to the accused and the opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s material remain essential. The decision is not authority for introducing a surprise electronic record or post-dated certification in a way that prejudices the defence.

The Supreme Court also stressed preservation of electronic records and metadata. If the source data has disappeared by the time a certificate is issued, the defence may lose the ability to test the record against the original system.

5. Section 65B of the Evidence Act and the corresponding BSA provisions

The judgment in Arjun Panditrao interpreted the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, particularly Sections 65A and 65B. For proceedings governed by the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), which came into force on 1 July 2024, the current provisions must be separately examined. The old and new section numbers should not be treated as interchangeable without reading the updated text.

  • Section 57 BSA — Primary evidence: corresponding broadly to Section 62 of the Indian Evidence Act. Explanations 4–7 expressly deal with electronic records created or stored in multiple files, records produced from proper custody (unless disputed), simultaneously stored or transmitted videos, and automated storage spaces.
  • Section 61 BSA — Electronic or digital records: electronic form alone does not deny admissibility or legal effect; the statutory recognition is expressly subject to Section 63.
  • Section 62 BSA — Special provision for proving electronic records: the contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with Section 63. This broadly corresponds to the role performed by Section 65A of the former Evidence Act.
  • Section 63(1) BSA — Computer output: the conditions for treating a printout, stored, recorded or copied electronic output as a document admissible without production of the original. This broadly corresponds to Section 65B(1).
  • Section 63(2)(a)–(d) BSA — Foundational conditions: regular use of the device, regular feeding of information, proper operation (or no impact from malfunction), and accurate derivation of the output. These broadly track Section 65B(2).
  • Section 63(3) BSA — Multiple devices and systems: addresses computers or communication devices operating on a standalone system, network, information-processing resource or through an intermediary; compare Section 65B(3).
  • Section 63(4)(a)–(c) BSA — Certificate: identification of the electronic record, particulars of the device and manner of production, satisfaction of the statutory conditions, and certification by the responsible person and an expert; compare Section 65B(4).
  • Section 63(5) BSA — Interpretive provisions: addresses how information is supplied to a device and how electronic outputs may be produced.
  • Section 170(2) BSA — Repeal and saving: identifies proceedings that continue under the repealed Indian Evidence Act.

6. How the new Section 63(4) certificate works

Section 63(4) BSA provides for submitting the certificate along with the electronic record at each instance where that record is submitted for admission. The certification covers the record, the device and the production process. The statutory wording refers to signature by the person in charge of the computer, communication device or management of the relevant activities, and an expert.

The Schedule to the BSA, read with Section 63(4)(c), prescribes two certificate components: Part A (Party) and Part B (Expert). It seeks particulars such as device or source type (mobile phone, DVR, computer, server, cloud storage), make and model, available identifiers, hash value and hashing algorithm, with a hash report annexed. A lawyer should use the prescribed form applicable to the proceeding rather than simply relabelling an old Section 65B certificate.

Section 57 and original electronic records: Arjun Panditrao held that the old Section 65B(4) certificate was unnecessary where an original electronic record was produced and proved as primary evidence. The BSA now contains expanded primary-evidence explanations in Section 57. However, Section 61 expressly refers back to Section 63, so whether a particular item is genuinely primary evidence and how it must be tendered require analysis under the new statute. A copied screenshot or extracted pen-drive file should not be casually described as an original merely to avoid certification.

7. Which law governs a case already pending on 1 July 2024?

The commencement date alone does not resolve the question. Under Section 170(2) BSA, an application, trial, inquiry, investigation, proceeding or appeal that was already pending immediately before 1 July 2024 continues under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as saved by that provision. Identify the relevant proceeding and its commencement date before filing or objecting to electronic evidence.

For example, a lawyer dealing with a newly instituted proceeding governed by the BSA should examine Sections 57, 61, 62 and 63 and the prescribed Schedule; a saved older proceeding may instead require the Section 65B(4) certificate under the former Act. The question should be answered from Section 170(2) and the actual procedural record, not a generic date printed on a certificate.

8. Practical preparation of CCTV, WhatsApp, CDR and other electronic evidence

  • Identify the source: Is the evidence on the original phone or DVR, or is it an exported file, printout, copied CD or downloaded record?
  • Preserve the original: Retain the device, original file, extraction details and relevant metadata. Do not rely only on a forwarded or edited version.
  • Trace the person who can certify: For a server or third-party system, identify the custodian or responsible official and record requests made for certification.
  • Match the applicable statute: Determine whether the matter is governed by the saved Evidence Act regime or the BSA, and prepare the required certificate accordingly.
  • Deal with timing early: Seek missing certification or a court direction promptly, before preservation periods expire or the opposing party loses a fair chance to inspect the material.
  • Separate admissibility from proof: A formally compliant certificate does not establish that the contents of a message are true, that a voice belongs to a named person, or that a recording has not otherwise been manipulated.

The point that is often missed

The central lesson of Arjun Panditrao is not that electronic records should be excluded on technicalities, nor that judges may overlook the statute whenever certification is inconvenient. The judgment requires counsel and courts to address both concerns: statutory assurance about the electronic output and a workable procedure to obtain certification from whoever controls the source.

For criminal defence, civil litigation, matrimonial disputes and commercial proceedings, a sound objection should identify whether the material is an original or an output, what certificate is required, whether it exists, and whether the alleged defect can properly be cured. Those questions are more useful than a blanket assertion that every screenshot is inadmissible.

Judgment and statutory references

Editorial note (14 November 2026): This commentary concerns the statutory method of proving electronic records. Admissibility, objections, appropriate relief and transitional application depend on the particular proceeding and its evidence.

Related practice information: criminal proceedings and bail in Delhi.

Does Long Temporary Service Guarantee a Government Job? Understanding Umadevi

Case: Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1
Supreme Court of India | 10 April 2006

A person may work for a government department for years, sometimes performing duties similar to those of permanent staff. Does the length of that service create a legal right to a permanent appointment?

The Constitution Bench ruling in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) remains one of the starting points for answering that question.

The constitutional issue

The litigation concerned temporary, daily-wage and other non-regular appointments in public employment. The Court was required to consider those employees’ claims against the constitutional requirement that public posts ordinarily be filled through a fair recruitment process.

Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution require equality of opportunity in public employment. The Court reasoned that allowing appointments made outside the prescribed process to become permanent merely through the passage of time could prejudice qualified persons who never had an opportunity to compete.

The general rule

The Supreme Court held that temporary, casual or contractual service does not, by itself, confer an enforceable right to absorption or regularisation.

The length of service and the hardship caused by uncertainty may be relevant considerations, but they cannot automatically cure a recruitment process contrary to constitutional requirements.

An important, limited qualification

The judgment also recognised the possibility of a one-time exercise for certain irregular—not illegal—appointments. It referred to duly qualified persons who had worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts, without the protection of court or tribunal orders.

That qualification is often misunderstood as a general rule that every employee completing ten years must be made permanent. It is not. Whether the post was sanctioned, whether the employee possessed the prescribed qualifications and whether the appointment was irregular rather than illegal are central questions.

The Supreme Court later explained aspects of this exception in State of Karnataka v. M.L. Kesari, (2010) 9 SCC 247.

Why it matters in service litigation

A regularisation claim needs more than an appointment letter and a calculation of years worked. Recruitment rules, sanctioned strength, qualifications, the circumstances of engagement and applicable policies or later judgments must all be examined.

For public employers, the same case underscores the importance of making regular appointments through lawful recruitment rather than relying indefinitely on informal arrangements.

Umadevi does not reduce public employment to a question of sympathy or seniority alone. It places the individual’s claim within the constitutional obligation to keep recruitment fair and open.

Judgment: Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1.

Related practice information: service and employment law in Delhi.

Can Homebuyers Approach Consumer Commissions Despite RERA? Imperia Structures Explained

Case: Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni, (2020) 10 SCC 783
Supreme Court of India | 2 November 2020

A delayed housing project can leave buyers paying instalments and loan interest while possession remains uncertain. One question repeatedly raised in such disputes is whether the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) requires a homebuyer to pursue only the remedies available under that legislation.

The Supreme Court addressed that issue in Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni. Its answer was significant for buyers who had already invoked consumer law.

The dispute

The case concerned purchasers of apartments in a residential project in Gurugram. Completion had been delayed, and the buyers approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission seeking relief.

The Commission allowed their complaints. The developer challenged those decisions, contending, among other things, that the introduction of RERA altered the jurisdiction of consumer forums in relation to registered real estate projects.

Does RERA close the consumer forum’s door?

The Supreme Court rejected that contention. It examined the provisions of RERA, including Sections 18, 79 and 88, and held that the statutory remedies were not intended to extinguish the additional remedy available under consumer protection law.

The restriction on civil-court jurisdiction under Section 79 did not bar consumer forums from entertaining eligible complaints. The Court also noted that RERA itself preserved the availability of other remedies.

The developer’s appeals were dismissed.

What this means for a homebuyer

A buyer facing delayed possession may need to compare the remedies, procedure and jurisdiction of RERA with those under consumer protection legislation. Eligibility as a ‘consumer’, the relief actually sought and the relevant statutory requirements still have to be examined.

The judgment should not be read as permission to obtain duplicate compensation for the same injury. It confirms the availability of alternative statutory avenues; it does not dispense with ordinary requirements of maintainability or proof.

Why the ruling remains relevant

Although the dispute arose under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the principle that a special real-estate remedy does not by itself displace consumer protection remains important in the later consumer-law framework.

For both purchasers and developers, Imperia Structures makes one point clear: the creation of RERA did not make every consumer complaint concerning a housing project legally unavailable.

Judgment: Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni, (2020) 10 SCC 783.

Related practice information: consumer and real estate remedies in Delhi.

Is the IBC a Debt Recovery Tool? What Swiss Ribbons Clarified

Case: Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17
Supreme Court of India | 25 January 2019

When a company defaults on a substantial payment, its creditors naturally want recovery. Yet the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was designed to do something more complex than collect unpaid invoices.

That distinction was central to the Supreme Court’s decision in Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, which considered constitutional challenges to important provisions of the Code.

What was challenged?

Among other issues, the petitioners questioned the different treatment of financial and operational creditors and the procedures through which they could initiate insolvency proceedings.

The contention was that these distinctions were arbitrary. The Supreme Court rejected that broad challenge and upheld the constitutional framework of the Code.

Resolution comes before liquidation

The Court emphasised the legislation’s focus on reviving the corporate debtor where possible, preserving its existence as a going concern and maximising the value of its assets.

This helps explain why an insolvency proceeding is not equivalent to an ordinary money recovery suit. Once the corporate insolvency resolution process begins, the law introduces a collective framework for examining the company’s future and the treatment of its creditors.

Payment of a particular creditor’s dues is important, but it is not the only objective against which the process must be understood.

Why do financial and operational creditors have different roles?

The Court considered the distinct positions of lenders and those supplying goods or services. Financial creditors are generally positioned to assess viability, restructuring and the feasibility of proposed resolution plans. The Code accordingly gives them a central role through the committee of creditors.

Operational creditors retain statutory protections, but the two classes do not perform identical functions within the insolvency framework. The Court found a rational basis for treating them differently.

What the decision means for businesses

Before filing an insolvency application, a creditor needs to consider the nature of the debt, the existence of default, the statutory requirements for admission and the consequences of initiating a collective process. An operational debt may also raise questions about any pre-existing dispute.

For corporate debtors, the case shows why a serious payment default cannot be treated as merely another bilateral contractual disagreement.

The essential point of Swiss Ribbons is easy to miss: creditor recoveries matter, but the Code’s principal purpose is a structured insolvency resolution process, with liquidation as a consequence where resolution cannot be achieved.

Judgment: Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17.

Related practice information: commercial and insolvency matters in Delhi.

Maintenance and Financial Disclosure: Why Rajnesh v. Neha Matters

Case: Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324
Supreme Court of India | 4 November 2020

A maintenance proceeding often begins with two sharply different accounts of the same household finances. One party says there is no regular income; the other points to expenses, assets or a standard of living that appears inconsistent with that claim.

In Rajnesh v. Neha, the Supreme Court recognised how difficult it is to determine fair maintenance when essential financial information is missing or when parties have approached different courts under different statutes.

Why were guidelines necessary?

Claims for maintenance may arise under matrimonial legislation, the law governing domestic violence and provisions concerning maintenance of dependants. Proceedings can overlap, sometimes resulting in different orders without the second court having a complete picture of the first.

The Supreme Court therefore issued guidelines intended to create greater consistency in the consideration of maintenance claims.

Disclosure is not optional

A central direction was that parties in maintenance proceedings should file the prescribed affidavits disclosing assets and liabilities. These documents are intended to place relevant income, financial obligations, assets and expenditure before the court.

That does not mean a figure stated in an affidavit must be accepted without scrutiny. Documentary records, explanations of transactions and the credibility of the disclosures remain important.

What if maintenance has already been awarded elsewhere?

The Court held that earlier maintenance proceedings and orders must be disclosed in subsequent proceedings. A court assessing a later claim should account for maintenance already awarded and consider an appropriate adjustment or set-off.

The principle is not that a person is barred from seeking relief under another law. Rather, the same maintenance entitlement should not be counted twice without regard to an existing order. Any change to the earlier order must be sought before the court that passed it.

The starting date of maintenance

The judgment also directed that maintenance be awarded from the date of filing the application, rather than allowing delays in disposal to defeat the purpose of support.

For litigants, this makes the date of the application and the calculation of arrears important parts of the dispute, not mere procedural details.

A practical reading

Rajnesh v. Neha does not prescribe a fixed percentage of income that must be paid in every case. Quantum depends on the circumstances, including the parties’ means, reasonable needs, obligations and the material before the court.

Its enduring contribution is procedural fairness: disclosure by both sides, recognition of existing orders and a more consistent approach to maintenance from the date of application.

Judgment: Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324.

Related practice information: family and matrimonial proceedings in Delhi.

Which Disputes Can Be Arbitrated? Understanding Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading

Case: Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1
Supreme Court of India | 14 December 2020

An arbitration clause can resolve many commercial disagreements without a conventional civil trial. It cannot, however, confer jurisdiction over every imaginable dispute. That was one of the important distinctions examined in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation.

The judgment addressed two connected questions: which disputes can lawfully be decided by an arbitral tribunal, and how closely should a court examine that issue when asked to refer the parties to arbitration?

The dispute behind the decision

The proceedings arose in the context of a landlord-tenant dispute and an arbitration agreement. Earlier decisions had created uncertainty over whether tenancy matters were capable of being resolved by arbitration. The Supreme Court used the reference to clarify the broader law of arbitrability.

The Court drew a distinction between ordinary landlord-tenant disputes governed by the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which may be arbitrable, and disputes governed by special rent-control legislation conferring exclusive jurisdiction on particular courts or forums.

The test for non-arbitrability

The Supreme Court explained that arbitration is generally inappropriate where the dispute concerns rights against the world at large rather than merely the parties; directly affects third-party rights and requires centralised determination; involves sovereign or public-interest functions; or is reserved by statute, expressly or by necessary implication, for another forum.

This is not a formula to be applied mechanically. The nature of the right, the relief claimed and the governing statute all matter. Simply calling a dispute ‘commercial’ does not make it arbitrable.

Who decides whether the dispute can go to arbitration?

The Court also cautioned against turning an application under Section 8 or Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 into a full hearing on the merits.

At the referral stage, judicial scrutiny is limited. A court may refuse reference where invalidity or non-arbitrability is manifest. Where the objection requires disputed factual examination or raises a genuinely arguable question, it will ordinarily be left to the arbitral tribunal.

What contracting parties should take from the ruling

Before invoking arbitration, parties should examine not only the wording of their arbitration clause but also the statutory character of the dispute. That is particularly important in agreements involving regulated rights or remedies assigned to specialist authorities.

The judgment protects the parties’ decision to arbitrate while recognising that contractual consent cannot displace every statutory jurisdiction. Both propositions are necessary to understand Vidya Drolia.

Judgment: Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, (2021) 2 SCC 1.

Related practice information: commercial litigation and arbitration in Delhi.

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